test(landlock): cover landlock_add_rule end-to-end (nj0)

Extend the existing security-landlock scenario to also exercise
landlock_add_rule in-process. After creating the ruleset fd, the
scenario builds a struct landlock_path_beneath_attr (allowed_access =
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, parent_fd = open("/", O_PATH)) and calls
landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, &attr, 0)
(syscall nr 445), then closes both fds.

landlock_add_rule is unprivileged and has no process-wide side effects
(it only builds a ruleset that is never enforced), so it is safe to run
in the shared workload process. The call is issued unconditionally even
when ruleset creation fails: sys_enter_landlock_add_rule fires before
the kernel validates the fd, so the enter tracepoint is captured
regardless of whether Landlock is enabled, matching create_ruleset
coverage. ret is UNCLASSIFIED (0/-1, not a byte count).

TestSecurityLandlockCreateRuleset now adds landlock_add_rule to the
trace-arg set and asserts enter_landlock_add_rule MinCount>=1 plus a
positive event duration, capturing ruleset_fd at args[0] (KindFd).

landlock_restrict_self (ci0) is intentionally NOT covered here: it would
require a traced child subprocess, which the integration harness cannot
support (it filters by the single workload PID at the BPF layer).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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