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| author | Paul Buetow <paul@buetow.org> | 2026-06-30 12:18:53 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul Buetow <paul@buetow.org> | 2026-06-30 12:18:53 +0300 |
| commit | 77c23e337ae5b4c0d37bea153dd1497fb3d3507b (patch) | |
| tree | 122a7b34b83d762cfb617921fda579eab10a6adc | |
| parent | 11aa2791771b6d8b87605511de146e4dd4cdef6e (diff) | |
Fix unauth operator escalation -> /exec RCE
In guest/no-DB mode (Mode A, no authentication) chat::login granted
operator status (rang 0) to anyone who logged in with the nick matching
chat.defaultop ('Snoop'). An operator can run /exec (mods/commands/
yc_exec.cpp) which does popen() on an attacker-controlled shell string,
i.e. unauth -> RCE, and /set to re-enable disabled commands.
Fix: gate the defaultop grant on p_user->get_is_reg(). In Mode A
is_reg is only ever set under #ifdef DATABASE (compiled out), so no
guest can become operator; the only set_status(0) path is now dead.
Registered defaultops still get op once DB auth (Mode B) is enabled.
Defense-in-depth (per independent review): also physically omit
mods/commands/yc_exec.so from the revival image so the popen RCE
primitive is absent, not merely unreachable.
Verified in a container: logging in as 'Snoop' no longer grants op
(/exec returns 'No such command', no command output); /time and normal
guest use still work. Builds clean. Independent fresh-context review:
APPROVE-WITH-NITS; the drop-yc_exec.so hardening was applied; blanking
chat.defaultop was deliberately skipped to preserve the Mode B
bootstrap-op path.
| -rw-r--r-- | ychat/Dockerfile | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ychat/src/chat/chat.cpp | 9 |
2 files changed, 13 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/ychat/Dockerfile b/ychat/Dockerfile index 1804d54..43e9d7f 100644 --- a/ychat/Dockerfile +++ b/ychat/Dockerfile @@ -54,6 +54,12 @@ COPY --from=builder /build/ychat/bin/ychat /app/bin/ychat # Read-only resources COPY --from=builder /build/ychat/html/ /app/html/ COPY --from=builder /build/ychat/mods/ /app/mods/ +# Defense-in-depth: the /exec command module does popen() on an attacker- +# controlled shell string (host RCE for any operator). It is gated to +# operators by permissions and the defaultop grant now requires a +# registered user, but we also physically omit it from the revival image +# so the RCE primitive is absent, not merely unreachable. +RUN rm -f /app/mods/commands/yc_exec.so COPY docker-entrypoint.sh /app/docker-entrypoint.sh COPY etc/ychat.conf /app/etc/ychat.conf diff --git a/ychat/src/chat/chat.cpp b/ychat/src/chat/chat.cpp index cea9ab6..8910a80 100644 --- a/ychat/src/chat/chat.cpp +++ b/ychat/src/chat/chat.cpp @@ -257,8 +257,13 @@ chat::login( map<string,string> &map_params ) p_user->set_status( tool::string2int(map_params["status"])); } - // Prove if user is the default operator. - if ( tool::to_lower(wrap::CONF->get_elem("chat.defaultop")) == tool::to_lower(s_user) ) + // Grant operator status only to an AUTHENTICATED (registered) user whose + // nick matches chat.defaultop. In guest/no-DB mode (Mode A) is_reg is always + // false, so nobody can claim operator by simply logging in as the defaultop + // nick — this closes unauth -> op -> /exec (popen RCE) and /set (re-enable) + // escalation. Registered ops still work once database auth (Mode B) is on. + if ( p_user->get_is_reg() && + tool::to_lower(wrap::CONF->get_elem("chat.defaultop")) == tool::to_lower(s_user) ) { wrap::system_message(CHATDOP); p_user->set_status(0); |
